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ABSTRACT 
Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment * 
by Alastair R. Beresford, Dorothea Kübler† and Sören Preibusch 
We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants 
were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online 
stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the 
other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one 
Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all 
buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when 
prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often. 
 
 
Keywords:  privacy, willingness to pay, field experiments 
JEL Classification:  C93, D12 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Keine Zahlungsbereitschaft für Datenschutz: Ein Feldexperiment 
Wir messen die Zahlungsbereitschaft für Datenschutz in einem Feldexperiment. 
Die Teilnehmer konnten maximal eine DVD bei einem von zwei Online-Shops 
kaufen. Einer der beiden Läden verlangte immer mehr sensitive Daten als der 
andere, aber abgesehen davon waren die Läden gleich. Im ersten Treatment 
waren alle DVDs genau einen Euro günstiger bei dem Laden, der mehr 
sensitive Daten abfragte, und fast alle Käufer wählten diesen günstigeren 
Laden. In einem zweiten Treatment mit identischen Preisen bei beiden Läden 
kauften die Teilnehmer überraschenderweise bei beiden Läden gleich häufig. 
                                                 
*  Acknowledgements: We thank Wei Min Wang and Mark Henninger for very valuable research 
assistance. Financial support from the SFB649 (”Economic Risk”) is gratefully acknowledged.
  
†  Corresponding author: Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, D-
10785 Berlin, Germany. Email: kuebler@wzb.eu, tel: +49 30 25491 440, fax: +49 30 25491 400. 
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1. Introduction 
The economics of privacy is controversial. The Chicago School (Posner, 1981) argues that 
privacy protection harms efficiency. In contrast, it has been asserted that property rights over 
the private data of individuals lead to the efficient outcome (Shapiro and Varian, 1997). But 
this view is contested, too. First, privacy may lead to efficient equilibrium outcomes even if 
people do not appreciate it individually (Hermalin and Katz, 2006; Wathieu 2009). Second, 
many contracts involving personal data are incomplete or highly opaque, as they typically 
lack clear-cut information about secondary uses and sharing of personal information, thereby 
limiting consumers’ ability to understand what their data are used for, even retrospectively. 
Up to now, economists have not systematically studied choices regarding privacy in such 
environments. 
It has been observed that consumers express concerns regarding misuse of personal data yet 
continue to provide personal data on social networks and online shopping sites.1 To 
understand this behavior, observations from a natural environment have the disadvantage that 
the (unobservable) cost of switching to another supplier affects choices. Relatedly, present-
biased preferences have been put forward as an explanation of inconsistent privacy choices 
(Acquisti, 2004). In our experiment, we are able to control for both explanations as there are 
two competing online stores that differ with respect to the mandatory data collected, and 
buying at the more privacy-friendly store does not prolong shopping time nor does it affect 
delivery time.2 Moreover, we do not draw attention to the issue of privacy as a whole (as in 
Tsai, 2007, where privacy ratings in search engines encourage consumers to choose more 
                                                            
1 See for example Acquisti and Grossklags (2005). 
2 In an experiment by Berendt et al. (2005) with a monopoly online store, present-biased preferences 
are a potential source of observed privacy choices. 
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privacy-friendly companies despite higher prices), but simply confront consumers with 
different data requirements at the two shops.  
      
2. Experimental design 
Participants were given the opportunity to buy one DVD from one of two online stores, 
named “SilverDisc Frankfurt” and “SilverDisc Cologne”. SilverDisc is a multichannel retailer 
of DVDs selling through Amazon, its own online shop, and a local branch in Berlin. The two 
branches in Frankfurt and Cologne are fictitious, but were chosen (with consent from 
SilverDisc) to minimize any differences between the two stores. All personal data provided by 
participants were given to SilverDisc and to Amazon as part of the transaction to purchase the 
DVD; this was explained in the instructions. On the order form, participants ticked a box to 
confirm they agreed with the data protection regulations and general terms and conditions of 
SilverDisc and Amazon, which were available upon request from the experimenters. 
A selection of DVDs was presented to the participants and listed on two order forms, one for 
“SilverDisc Frankfurt” and one for “SilverDisc Cologne”, that were presented side-by-side to 
minimize search costs.3 Participants were also free to search via a desktop computer for other 
DVDs and print new order forms. Two treatments were conducted. In both treatments, the 
mandatory data items for the two online shops were kept constant. While last name, first 
name, postal and email address were mandatory for both shops, “SilverDisc Frankfurt” also 
required a date of birth and monthly income, whereas “SilverDisc Cologne” asked for the year 
of birth and favorite color as mandatory fields.4 In treatment EQ, the prices at the two shops 
                                                            
3 Instructions and order forms are posted on http://www.wzb.eu/mp/vam/publications/journals.de.htm. 
4 Neither Amazon nor SilverDisc ask for income and favorite color. Thus, these data items had not 
been provided before by subjects who had already shopped at the online stores (75% with Amazon and 
11% with SilverDisc). 
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were equal, whereas in treatment DIF all prices at “SilverDisc Frankfurt” were exactly one 
Euro less than the prices at “SilverDisc Cologne”. Thus, in DIF there was a trade-off between 
data requirements and prices as subjects found information on personal income more sensitive 
than on favorite color (see Section 3).  
After subjects had made their purchase decision, they were asked to answer a post-
experimental questionnaire. Apart from some general questions, we asked participants how 
willing they are in general to provide personal data such as income and favorite color as well 
as other items. And we asked those who made a purchase how satisfied they were with the 
chosen store regarding privacy and price. 
All 225 participants in the experiment (students from the Technical University Berlin) 
received a show-up fee of 6 Euros which they received regardless of whether they made a 
purchase. In addition, all orders were subsidized by a discount of 7 Euros. The quoted price 
on the order form corresponded to the Amazon.de retail price plus the Amazon.de shipping 
costs (3 Euros) minus 1 Euro for “SilverDisc Frankfurt” in treatment DIF. 
 
3. Results 
Of the 225 participants, 74 made a purchase.5 Table 1 provides an overview of the results 
from both treatments DIF and EQ. In DIF, 39 of the 42 purchases were made at “SilverDisc 
Frankfurt” where prices were 1 Euro lower. Thus, participants predominantly chose the firm 
with the lower price and the more sensitive data requirement, indicating that they are willing 
to provide information about their monthly income and date of birth for a 1 Euro discount.  
To establish a benchmark of privacy concerns in purchasing decisions, we conducted 
treatment EQ in which the two firms asked for the same price, but differed with respect to the 
                                                            
5  Less than 9% of the non-buyers mentioned privacy concerns or lack of trust as the main reason for 
not buying while the majority indicated the product or its price. 
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data items required for the transaction. In this treatment, approximately the same number of 
participants purchased a DVD at “SilverDisc Frankfurt” and “SilverDisc Cologne”. Thus, the 
more privacy friendly firm failed to attract more customers even though prices were equal at 
both stores.  
The results of treatment EQ are surprising given the preferences over mandatory data items 
provided by subjects in the post-experimental questionnaire (Table 2). In treatment DIF, the 
fact that 32 out of 39 participants shopped with Frankfurt but reported a lower willingness to 
report income (required by the Frankfurt branch) than favorite color (required by the Cologne 
branch) can be rationalized with the price difference. However in EQ, 8 of the 15 customers 
of Frankfurt said they were less happy providing the data required by Frankfurt than by 
Cologne (with 6 being neutral and 1 preferring to provide the data asked for by Frankfurt).6 In 
addition, we asked customers to rate their satisfaction with price and privacy policy of the 
chosen store (see Table 3). All Frankfurt buyers in EQ who responded to a question 
concerning satisfaction with the privacy practices of Frankfurt (13 of 15) were dissatisfied.7 
The results can be explained if participants (mainly students) are unconcerned about privacy 
issues. However, in the post-experimental questionnaire 75% of the participants indicated that 
they have a very strong interest in data protection, and 95% said that they are interested in the 
protection of their personal information. Thus, participants’ concerns were slightly higher 
than those reported in the Eurobarometer Survey (Gallup, 2008). 
                                                            
6  This is evidence against the hypothesis of private benefits or indifference when providing personal 
information, but collective costs in our setup (Wathieu 2009).  
7  Table 3 also shows that participants noticed the difference in data requirements and prices between 
the two firms. Those who shopped with Cologne in treatment EQ were significantly more satisfied 
with the firm’s privacy policy than those who shopped with Frankfurt. In treatment DIF, those 
shopping with Frankfurt were significantly happier with the prices than those shopping with Cologne.  
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Providing false information is one method of protecting personal information. But except for 
one student who did not indicate his income, all subjects provided values that were reasonable 
in magnitude. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The experiment demonstrates an unwillingness to pay for privacy as the vast majority of 
subjects provide their monthly income for a price discount of one Euro. Even without a price 
discount, only half of the subjects shopped with the more privacy-friendly branch of the DVD 
retailer. This result is surprising given that most subjects who provide sensitive information 
are dissatisfied with it. Thus, observed behavior can neither be explained by a lack of 
awareness of privacy issues, nor can it be rationalized as a resolution of the trade-off between 
price and data protection in favor of price.  
Two interpretations are possible: either the stated dissatisfaction with data collection and 
privacy protection can be regarded as uninformative as it is uncorrelated with choices, or 
behavior in the experiment is not in line with revealed-preference theory. In the latter case, the 
results shed doubt on the view that pure assignment of property rights in personal information 
is sufficient to achieve efficiency.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Number of purchases at the two stores per treatment.   
Treatment “SilverDisc Frankfurt”
(income/date of birth) 
“SilverDisc Cologne” 
(favorite color/year of birth)
DIF 39 3 
EQ 15 17 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sensitivity of mandatory data items.  
 Less willing to provide 
information on 
 
 
Treatment Bought at Favourite 
color 
Income Neutral
DIF Cologne 0 3 0 
 Frankfurt 0 32 7 
EQ Cologne 0 17 0 
 Frankfurt 1 8 6 
Note: This table reports on the answers to the question “When you are asked for data, how 
willing are you to provide the following items?” Income and favorite color were listed among 
a number of other items. 
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Table 3. Absolute frequencies of satisfaction after purchase decision. 
Treatment  Bought at
Satisfaction
High 
Satisfaction
Low 
Significance 
(Fisher’s Exact) 
DIF Price Frankfurt 24 12 p=0.05 
  Cologne 0 3  
 Privacy Frankfurt 10 27 p=0.21 
  Cologne 2 1  
EQ Price Frankfurt 2 10 p=0.67 
  Cologne 4 12  
 Privacy Frankfurt 0 13 p=0.05 
  Cologne 5 11  
Note: This table reports on the answers to the question “How satisfied are you with the chosen 
store regarding price and privacy?” (Satisfaction values z-transformed; missing data for 
participants exactly between high and low; p-values two-tailed). 
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Dear Participant, 
On behalf of the Technical University Berlin and the University of Cambridge, we welcome you. 
Please read the instructions carefully as they include important information about today’s 
experiment. 
Scientific background: You are taking part in a joint scientific experiment by the Technical Uni-
versity Berlin and the University of Cambridge. Experiments such as today’s help us to collect reli-
able data that is needed for scientific publications and for academic journals. To analyze how con-
sumers make decisions in increasingly competitive markets we will be giving out order forms from 
two branches of SilverDisc in Cologne and Frankfurt, who sell their products on Amazon.de. 
Experiment length: We anticipate that the experiment will take 40 minutes. 
Ordering and Buying: During today’s experiment you will have the possibility to buy the product 
of your choice from one of the two firms of your choice. The range of products is the same for both 
firms. You are not obligated to buy. You can also decide not to buy anything. 
Product range: The order form that you will soon be given represents only a small choice of avail-
able DVDs. During the experiment you can search for as many other film titles as you wish. All 
available products will then be shown and you can request a new order form for these products 
from one of the experiment supervisors. 
Once you have decided to buy a product, your order will be placed. At Amazon.de, your order will 
be processed and confirmed and a new customer account will be created for you for that purpose. 
This account will be deactivated in four weeks once the return service agreement expires. A cus-
tomer account will also be created by SilverDisc. The branch you have chosen and Amazon will 
then process your personal data. 
Price and Payment: Payment for your chosen product takes place once you have chosen your 
type of payment. All prices are presented on the order form and can depend on which firm you 
have ordered from. Delivery is free of charge. 
Remuneration and Attendance Allowance: If you buy one of the products on offer you will re-
ceive a €7 subsidy. This subsidy will then be deducted from the purchasing price. Therefore, you 
will pay €7 less of the price given on the order form regardless of which product you buy or from 
which firm. You will not be given a subsidy should you choose not to purchase a product. 
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Your attendance allowance of €6 will be paid in cash following the experiment. In total, today’s re-
muneration can amount to €13. 
Rules and Regulations: Take note that mobile telephones are not permitted during today’s ex-
periment. Please place all mobile phones or similar devices in your pocket or bag before the ses-
sion begins. 
Please remain seated during the course of the experiment, even if you conclude the experiment 
earlier than expected. 
Today’s experiment consists of three stages: 
Preparation: You will be given an instruction form from the experiment supervisor. At the same 
time you will receive two printed order forms and an overview with background information on the 
film titles listed. The computer at your station will guide you through the experiment. It should, 
however, be switched off at the present time. 
Please take a moment to check that you have all the necessary material. Inform the experiment 
supervisor if anything is missing. Otherwise you can begin reading through. 
Purchasing: After the preparation, all participants simultaneously have the chance to complete 
one purchase and buy a maximum of one DVD. We then request that you confirm your decision on 
the screen. You do not need to wait but can then continue shopping should you wish to do so. Your 
remuneration today is not dependent on the speed of your decision. 
When buying you can decide between one of the following three possibilities: (1) Purchase one of 
your selected products from SilverDisc Cologne; (2) Purchase one of your selected products from 
SilverDisc Frankfurt; (3) No purchase. If you don’t choose any of those options you will not be enti-
tled to remuneration. Should you opt for products that are not listed on the order form you can 
search your computer for more titles. The experiment supervisor will then give you a new order 
form with your favoured titles. 
Ordering: Once you have chosen the product you wish to buy, the order form from the firm you 
have selected will be shown on your monitor. Please fill out the formula online. The printed order 
forms are a copy of the online forms and are only for your reference. After completing the order 
form online, your order is legally binding. 
Payment: The experiment is completed once all participants have filled out the completion ques-
tionnaire. You will then be paid for taking part in the experiment. If you choose to pay in cash, 
please give us the final invoice amount shown on your screen. Both firms also offer payment by 
bank transfer. Under University Regulations, we ask you to save your original receipts for our re-
cords. 
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Thank you for taking part. On behalf of the Technical University Berlin and the University of 
Cambridge we thank you once again for taking part in today’s experiment, for reading through and 
for your compliance with the instructions. This study has been approved by the Ethics Committee 
of the University of Cambridge. Should you have any further questions please raise your hand and 
one of the supervisors will attend to you. If you are ready to start, then please confirm on your 
monitor that the experiment can now begin. 
Prof. Dr. Dorothea Kübler 
Technical University Berlin 
Department of Economics 
Straße des 17. Juni 135 
D-10623 Berlin 
Sören Preibusch 
University of Cambridge 
Computer Laboratory 
15 JJ Thomson Avenue 
Cambridge CB3 0FD 
 
Please fill out the following Declaration of Consent for our files: 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may cancel at any time without giving rea-
sons. I have read the above description of the research and declare my consent to participate. 
 
Name:   ........................................  
Date:  ........................................  Signature:  ............................................. 
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